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Sebnem Kalemli‐Ozcan, University of Houston and NBER
Reinhart and Reinhart provide a systematic study of the episodes of in-
flux of capital, namely a “capital flow bonanza.” The authors develop an
algorithm, following the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), to date
the incidence of bonanzas. This algorithm allows them not only to detect
the smooth deterioration of the current account but also to analyze the
macroeconomic developments surrounding the bonanzas. The study
suggests a strong link between flows, global interest rates, and commod-
ity prices. Using data from 181 countries from 1980 to 2007 and a core
sample of 66 countries from 1960 to 2007, the authors show that (a) the
path of the current account around bonanzas is V‐shaped, (b) bonanza
periods are associated with a higher incidence of banking and currency
crises in developing countries only, (c) bonanzas precede sovereign de-
fault episodes, and (d) fiscal policy is procylical around bonanzas.
I think that this paper is an extremely valuable study for anyone
who is interested in capital flows and sovereign debt. My main com-
ments will be about the data issues, robustness, and the generalization
of the results. Most of the analysis is done for 66 countries, during
1960–2007: 58 are middle‐ (emerging) and high‐ (industrialized) income
and eight are low‐income (Africa) countries. Are there really data from
1960–2007 for all these countries? It would be nice to indicate which
countries have how many years of data in appendix table A1. If a cer-
tain set of countries have more years of data than others, then these sets
might be biasing the results. More important, most of the low‐income
and some of the middle‐income countries are heavily indebted poor
countries, which have received a lot of aid that shows up as capital in-
flows. Côte d’Ivoire, Bolivia, Honduras, and Mauritius are some ex-
a m p l e s .T h e r ea r ea l s os o m ec o u n t ries with debt forgiveness that
will show up as capital outflows. I think that there needs to be a robust-
ness exercise in which these countries are excluded. At the moment
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We might also worry about pooling emerging and industrialized
countriesfortheempiricalanalysissincethistypeofpoolingmightmask
important differences. Why keep oil exporters and importers together,
for example? Or why force the same coefficient on eastern European
countries that are low savers running a current account deficit and Asian
countries that are high savers running a current account surplus? Inter-
estingly enough, both of these sets of countries have similar average
growth rates in the last decade. I think that the paper would also benefit
fromclarifyingthedefinitionofthebonanzafurther.Thestartingpointof
the paper is that the old definition did not detect smooth deterioration of
the current account. However, it is not very clear how the new definition
is improving on this. The reader is referred to appendix figure A1, where
the labels “capital flows” and the “constructed capital flows” are not ex-
plained. The figure shows a stark difference between the “current account,”
“capital flows,” and the “constructed capital flows” during 1970–74 and
also to some extent the latter part of the sample. And it is not clear why
this is the case.
Finally, the results should be interpreted with caution since they rep-
resent conditional correlations instead of causal effects. Causality runs
both ways here. The authors are indeed careful about not interpreting
their regression results as casual. However, the difference between un-
conditional and conditional (on bonanza) probabilities of default can
also be due to many other “third” factors. For example, for the United
States, mortgage‐related securities are a significant part of the foreign
purchases, and hence lower mortgage interest rates may be a result
rather than a cause. Also in the case of procyclicality, which is based
on the correlation between output and government spending, the main
question is, what drives both?
Tosumup,Ithinktheauthorsundertakeaveryrichandsystematicem-
pirical study that brings many issues together. There are many interesting
resultsinthe paper thathighlight the importance offuture researchonthe
underlying drivers and causes of capital flows and sovereign defaults.
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